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Abstract: From the perspective of new institutionalism, this article studies the rules of doing business in
Poland in the context of the country’s accession to the European Union. The article’s starting point is
the premise that interaction between formal and informal institutions leads to an institutional balance or
imbalance and determines the ﬁnal shape of the economy and its effectiveness. Accordingly, the authors
analyze four types of relations occurring between the formal and informal rules of doing business in
Poland: (1) the inﬂuence of the restrictiveness of regulations on informal relations between the public
administration and business; (2) the relation between the low effectiveness of the law in regards to running
a business and informal adaptive reactions; (3) the effects of EU law on business strategies; (4) the effects of
the global economy on the extent and forms of cooperation between the public administration and business.
Analysis of empirical material provides a basis for constructing four institutional models of the rules of
doing business in Poland: the ‘antagonistic’ model, in which the administration and business are striving
for mutually exclusive goals; the ‘parallel’ model, where formal and informal institutions create separate
orders; the ‘alternative’ model, in which formal, new, EU solutions are created; and the ‘integrated’ model,
where actors are encouraged to realize common aims.
Keywords: New institutionalism, formal and informal institutions, Polish entrepreneurs, business law, public
administration
Introduction
The aim of this article is to describe and analyze the institutional dynamics involved
in the rules of doing business in Poland in the context of the country’s accession to
the European Union. Inspired by the views of new institutionalism, we assume that
the interaction between formal and informal institutions determines the shape of the
economy and its effectiveness. The small and medium-size business sector, which is
the object of our study, creates over 6 million jobs in Poland and produces nearly half
the country’s GDP.1 A careful and in-depth look at the informal strategies adopted by
1 Data from2011. Raport o stanie sektoramałych i średnich przedsiębiorstwwPolsce w latach 2011–2012
[Report on the State of the Small and Medium-Size Business Sector in Poland in the Years 2011–2012]
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entrepreneurs in regards to the law, the state administration, and ﬁnally the state as
a whole, will provide a better understanding of the functioning of the largest economy
in Central and Eastern Europe.
Grażyna Skąpska (Skąpska et al. 2010) regards Poland’s entry to the European
Union as a kind of a breakthrough or normative shift. Accession provided the im-
pulse for substantial institutional change. It also required the modiﬁcation of formal
institutions in accordance with EU requirements; most importantly, it initiated the
appearance of new informal patterns to replace those that were, among other things,
a reaction to the somewhat too restrictive or unclear legal regulations previously
blocking effective realization of business undertakings. Perhaps it was actually the
moment of accession that prevented society from getting ‘stuck’ in a system of con-
victions and institutions that ‘fail to confront and solve new problems of societal
complexity’ (North 1994: 364). To prove the above, we decided to concentrate on ana-
lyzing the relations between Polish businesspeople and public administrative bodies in
the ﬁeld of economic activities after Poland’s accession to the EuropeanUnion. These
relations are the empirical canvas on the basis of which we analyze the ties between
formal and informal institutions regulating business. In writing about the relations of
small and medium-size Polish entrepreneurs with the public administration, we refer
to the concepts of new institutionalism, as the problems and phenomena described
here are primarily institutional in nature and the said relations are shaped in the con-
text of both the constraints and the opportunities which institutions form: the formal
ones, with law and administrative regulations in ﬁrst place, and the informal ones,
in the shape of norms, values, and previously developed and prolonged methods of
dealing with various, often difﬁcult, situations. We particularly want to concentrate
on the dynamics of the informal institutions regulating key areas of economic activity
in Poland.
The structure of our article is as follows: ﬁrst we present selected new-insti-
tutional concepts of the relation between formal and informal institutions and
the idea of an institutional-organizational ﬁeld—an autonomous sphere of activity
within whose circumference these relations occur. Next we deﬁne four phenom-
ena involved in the relations between formal regulations affecting business activ-
ities and informal reactions to those regulations. Then we describe and analyze
each of these phenomena, while considering the relations between entrepreneurs
and public administration in Poland concerning business activity, the historical con-
ditions of the creation of legislation, the broader political-economic context, and
the consequences of these two last elements for ongoing relations between busi-
ness and public administration. In the ﬁnal part of our article we put the results of
our research in a theoretical context, introducing the four models of relations be-
tween formal and informal institutions characterizing the ﬁeld of doing business in
Poland.
2013: 14 and 27; Działalność przedsiębiorstw nieﬁnansowych w 2011 r. [The Activity of Non-Financial
Enterprises in 2011] Main Statistical Ofﬁce 2013: 1.
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Research Methodology
Our article is based on research conducted within the framework of a project entitled
‘Models of Participation of Polish Entrepreneurs in the European Union: Socio-Cul-
tural and Institutional Conditioning’, which was ﬁnanced by the Ministry of Science
and Higher Education and carried out by a group directed by Grażyna Skąpska in the
years 2009–2011.2 Over 100 in-depth individual interviews (IDI) with entrepreneurs,3
primarily from the small and medium-size business sector, but also with managers of
large ﬁrms, were conducted in four voivodeships in the south of Poland: Małopolskie,
Śląskie, Świętokrzyskie, and Podkarpackie. The aim was to reconstruct the opinions,
experiences, and motivations of businesspeople in regard to doing business in Poland
and other countries of the European Union, and to recreate the relation of business
with its environment, particularly the administrative environment. We compared the
results of this research with other data, including theWorld Bank’s annualDoing Busi-
ness reports, which evaluate the ease of doing business in over a hundred countries
on the basis of several standardized indicators (see Doing Business 2006–2013). While
we are aware of the limitations of this aggregated set of data, we have used it for its
variety and because it is relatively standardized and includes country comparisons. It
is based on the opinions of ‘local experts’, including above all those who work for law
ﬁrms, and also on more measurable and objective indicators. 4
In our article we try to picture the institutional changes that have occurred in
both formal and informal institutions of Poland’s business sphere. To capture these
changesweusedmaterial from the interviews: one set of questions referred speciﬁcally
2 Grant N116 2830 35 (2830/B/H03/2008/35); project realized at the Institute of Sociology of the Jagiel-
lonian University.
3 The research was conducted by researchers, doctoral students, and undergraduates of the Institute of
Sociology of the Jagiellonian University. Interviews enabled an in-depth exploration of the issues, within
the framework of a ﬂexible and dynamic structure of interaction with the interviewees in their natural
environment (most often the ﬁrm’s headquarters). The interviewees were speciﬁcally chosen with regard
to the size of the ﬁrm. In addition, an effort was made to ensure that the entrepreneurs represented various
branches of business activity.
After a series of pilot interviews, an initial analysis of the gathered material was conducted, thus
allowing the interview format to be modiﬁed. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The
information acquired was encoded using MAXQDA software, to allow for easier data analysis.
The interviewees were asked several sets of questions about doing business: concerning aims, mo-
tivations, and causes for undertaking business activity; sources of ﬁnancing; barriers and risks in doing
business; comparison of Polish and EU law, as well as supra-legal norms (with consideration of formal
and informal institutional changes); value systems, law, and supra-legal norms; trust and social relations;
pathologies of the public sphere from the viewpoint of business activity (including in relations with the
public administration); and also changes in the discourse connected with business.
4 The Doing Business report has been criticized from several standpoints, primarily on methodological
grounds and on the quality of the data used. Even the creation of a ranking of countries meets with
scepticism. One should be aware that a country’s change or maintenance of its position in the ranking does
not yet testify to quantiﬁable institutional changes. Thus in the further part of our article we will refer above
all to speciﬁc, objective data contained in World Bank reports concerning, for instance, the duration or
number of procedures required in a given area of economic life. Many aspects of the tendencies indicated
by the World Bank have been conﬁrmed by our research, which shows ongoing changes to the business
environment at the institional level. The data contained in the Doing Business reports, in connection with
the qualitative data we have gathered and analysis of the change in the state of law in our area of study,
constitute signiﬁcant and valuable information for our arguments.
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to the entrepreneurs’ perceptions of any institutional changes thatmay have occurred.
Secondly, we analyze the legal regulations, pointing out speciﬁc reforms and legislative
changes. Finally, we refer to earlier research5 conﬁrming the hypothesis that ‘pirate
capitalism’, based on corruption, inﬂuence-seeking, and lack of trust, developed in
Poland in the 1990s (see Skąpska 2002; Skąpska 2003). On these bases, we discuss the
institutional changes occurring in Polish business life.
Formal versus Informal Institutions: Institutional Balance and Imbalance
in the Field of Business Activity
One indubitable achievement of the new institutional approach in comparison to
classic institutional theories was to locate the informal institutions regulating daily
interactions and behaviour at the centre of research interest. In institutional analyses,
alongside the usual research on formal institutions such as constitutions, regulations,
statutes, and other ofﬁcial documents (which are usually reactions to current chal-
lenges and problems, and are planned and implemented for the purpose of achieving
set results), the informal, unwritten, and unadvertised rules (which are often formed
in the long term as a result of daily, spontaneous contacts, and are of greater or lesser
inertia as far as their susceptibility to change), have come to be studied (Chavance
2008; North 1990; Williamson 2000).
In this article, we are interested above all in the dynamics of informal institutions
in the context of their relations with formal institutions. We assume that the links
informal institutions have with formal institutions are a very important—but not
the sole—source of their evolution. Although the form and direction of interaction
between formal and informal institutions is described variously in new institutional
literature, the majority of researchers agree that the two types of institutions cannot
exist without one another and mutually condition each other. It is thus worthwhile
to trace several of the most well-known new institutional concepts describing the
relations between formal and informal institutions.
In the terms of economic new institutionalism, Portes and Haller (2005) frame
this close interdependence as four paradoxes. For us, the ‘paradox of embeddedness’
is particularly important. In it, if the role of the state diminishes within the bounds
of the ‘free market’, the role of informal regulatory institutions (for instance, trust,
tradition, and custom) must increase, as an unregulated free market is unable to
function without them. Someone or something (principles, rules) must secure market
transactions, and if the state does not do it, then informal social institutions must. And
therefore, as Portes and Haller seem to suggest, the lack of proper formal regulation
is an invitation for the appearance of informal, substitute, institutions.
5 Grant 1H01F 06910 Tworzenie bogactwa. Społeczno-kulturowe uwarunkowania przekształceń eko-
nomicznych w Polsce [The Creation of Wealth: The Socio-Cultural Background of the Economic Trans-
formation in Poland], a project realized at the Institute of Sociology of the Jagiellonian University in the
years 1998–2000 by a team under the direction of Grażyna Skąpska.
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Within the framework of political new institutionalism Hans-Joachim Lauth
(2000), referring to Guillermo O‘Donnel’s question (1996), asks whether informal
institutions matter for democracy. To him a problem arises when formal institutions
are unable to guarantee the order for which they were constituted, that is, when
a divergence between the behavioural norms of formal institutions and the actual
behaviour of individuals appears. According to Lauth, informal institutions do not
need any external sources of legitimation to exist, which is not the case for formal in-
stitutions, legitimated through the state’s agencies and its authority as the sovereign.
Informal institutions have no centre directing and co-ordinating their actions and
they collapse when they cease to be useful, whereas non-effective formal institutions
can survive, at least in part. In democracies, formal and informal institutions can
have different relationships to each other. Lauth distinguishes between three types
of relationship: the complementary type, in which one can observe the co-existence
of both types of institutions and their mutual reinforcement; the substitutive type, in
which either formal or informal institutions are effective because of being functionally
equivalent to each other; and the conﬂicting type, when the two systems of rules are
incompatible. The conﬂicting type is particularly interesting. In this case, formal and
informal institutions can displace each other or they can be mutually interconnected.
‘Whilst displacement can be achieved through different strategies and has the elimination or occupation
of formal institutions as its aim, interconnection demands a precarious coexistence on the part of both.
The reason for this is that informal institutions are dependent upon the existence of formal institutions.
They live, as it were, at the expense of the former, by exploiting them for their own purposes, by either
partially occupying or penetrating them. In this sense they are parasitic institutions which, for example, ﬁnd
their expression in corruption. Such institutions, which should be understood, so to speak, as ‘penetrating’
environments evade to a considerable degree any quantitatively oriented empirical analysis. This is because
they do not change the form of formal institutions and ‘shy away from publicity’ themselves. At the same
time, however, their relevance is not to be underestimated, as they are capable of exerting quite considerable
pressure upon the way in which formal institutions function’ (Lauth 2000: 25–26).
Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, following Lauth, introduce two new as-
pects of the relation between formal and informal institutions. The ﬁrst concerns in-
stitutional convergence, that is, the degree to which the effects of observing both types
of rules converge. On the other hand, there is the effectiveness of formal regulations,
and thus the likelihood that the written rules and procedures will be enforced and
complied with in practice (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 728). Beyond these aspects,
four types of informal institutions are set forth: complementary, accommodating,
substitutive, and competing (ibidem, pp. 728–730). The ﬁrst two types of informal
institutions coexist with effective formal institutions: complementary informal insti-
tutions aim at the same goals and increase the likelihood of their realization; while
making use of accommodating informal rules, actors pursue goals that are different
from those of the formal rules, but without directly opposing them. The latter type is
usually created by actors who are dissatisﬁed with the results of formal institutions, but
do not have the ability to change or openly violate them. The remaining two types of
informal institutions appear in the case of a lack of—or the ineffectiveness of—formal
rules. Substitutive institutions realize objectives that formal institutions should—but
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for various reasons fail—to realize. In turn, the use of competitive informal rules
leads to the breaking or ignoring of formal rules (ibidem).
To summarize this part of our considerations, it should be noted that the concepts
presented here are based on two premises. The ﬁrst, as we have already mentioned, is
that formal and informal institutions create a certain whole, a dyadic system. Accord-
ing to the second premise, this system is either in a relative balance, when its parts are
complementary or mutually reinforcing, we can then speak of a sort of institutional
effectiveness, or in imbalance, where formal and informal institutions are in conﬂict
with one another, which results in mutual hindrance or dismantling, invalidation, or
possibly even an ‘enemy penetration’ by the informal institutions. In the context of
the rules of doing business in Poland, the question of whether we are dealing with
an institutional balance or imbalance appears to be a key theoretical issue. First,
however, the question should be answered as to how the institutional whole, within
which the balance or imbalance could occur, is to be understood.
Interaction between formal and informal rules occurs most often in a set organi-
zational-institutional ﬁeld, that is, in an autonomous separate sphere of activity, in
which individual or organizational actors, in realizing their interests, engage in various
relations such as conﬂict, rivalry, exchange, solidarity, or cooperation (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983; March and Olsen 1989; Meyer and Rowan 1991; Scott and Meyer 1994;
Nee 2005, Bourdieu and Wacquant 2006). 6 The ﬁeld that interests us is the part of
business activities that is subject to various administrative regulations. In this manner
relations are formed between the two main groups of actors in the ﬁeld (businesspeo-
ple and bureaucrats), although there are also other actors operating, such as corporate
lawyers, business journalists, and experts. In our understanding of the ﬁeld, we refer
partially to Victor Nee’s concept of the organizational ﬁeld (2005: 56–57). Groups
and organizations typically create an organizational ﬁeld or a production market,
consisting of a circle of ﬁrms or organizations closely tied by cooperation, rivalry, or
exchanges. In referring directly to Powell’s and DiMaggio’s concept of institutional
isomorphism (1983), Nee presents institutionalization processes in an organizational
ﬁeld or a production market as, on the one hand, rivalry for position or status, con-
ducted by, for instance, ﬁrms in a certain production or service niche, and on the other
hand, the search for a source of legitimization in some organizational ﬁeld of activity
characterizing non-proﬁt organizations or public-service institutions: schools, muse-
ums, social-aid centres, and similar types of outlets. In either case, both resources
and legitimization are necessary for ﬁrms and organizations (public administration
ofﬁces) to survive in an organizational ﬁeld, and the attempt to acquire them leads to
subordination to the rules of the game and the cultural notions predominant in a given
ﬁeld (Nee 2005: 57). Next Nee introduces the notion of the institutional environment,
which constitutes the formal context of activity for an organization in the form of the
state-imposed and state-monitored regulatory principles governing property rights
and markets, as well as the rules for creating and operating enterprises. This envi-
6 As Neil Fligstein has stressed, the concept of local institutional orders, called organizational ﬁelds,
playing ﬁelds, or simply ﬁelds, is a common element of the various branches of new institutionalism
(2009: 277).
FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES OF DOING BUSINESS IN POLAND 481
ronment, however, does not constitute either an objective institutional framework,
or a kind of abstract regulatory space (the invisible hand of the market); it is rather
co-shaped by the actors operating in a given ﬁeld (ibidem). In the case of business ac-
tivities, which are the subject of our study, relations of cooperation, rivalry, or conﬂict
could involve material resources (the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, a bribe, bureaucratic bonuses), as
well as immaterial resources (prestige, position, respect, and also image, the brand),
and we will place our primary emphasis on the (informal) rules of the game that are
applied in play and which eventually lead to the institutionalization of the ﬁeld in
a particular form. We are also interested in how external (formal) institutional rules
are established both by the actors in the ﬁeld and by those outside of it.
We assume that the overriding aim of the formal and informal rules of the game in
doing business should be effective economy fulﬁlling the priciples of competition. The
law should, in the simplest and most transparent manner, regulate economic activity
so that it is conducted in accord with the principles of competitiveness. Public ofﬁcials
should uphold and preserve the legal regulations: for instance, those relating to the
distribution of EU funds for entrepreneurs, or tax regulations, so they do not limit
the competitiveness of native entrepreneurship, while entrepreneurs should strive
to generate proﬁt by raising their own competitiveness, but in accord with the legal
regulations. This is howwe understand, in the practical sense, the institutional balance
we discussed earlier. After all, what counts is that the aims of the legislators, contained
in the legal regulations and the activities of various groups of actors functioning in
the business ﬁeld, should maximize the common good: a competitive free market
economy. In the theoretical sense, institutional balance and imbalance involve the
network of relations between the formal and informal institutions regulating the
activities of actors in a given organizational-institutional ﬁeld from the viewpoint of
the mutual relations between these groups. In introducing two levels of analysis—
institutions and activities—we can simultaneously track the theoretical consequences
these differentiations entail.
The Rules of Doing Business in Poland
Helmke and Levitsky consider several basic sources of changes in informal insti-
tutions, including at least two involving the relations between formal and informal
institutions (2004: 731–733). The ﬁrst source of change in informal institutions is the
introduction of new formal projects, which could rapidly change the proﬁt and loss
balance connected with respecting informal rules. Changes within formal institutions
could cause informal institutions to change in accordance with the objectives of the
plan for institutional change. For example, Leszek Balcerowicz’s 1989 reforms trig-
gered the emergence of millions of private ﬁrms, which thenceforth, in accordance
with the intentions of the reforms, could operate legally instead of functioning in
a grey economy. But formal projects can also have unintended consequences. For ex-
ample, the introduction of too restrictive tax regulations can lead to the appearance of
a grey market. Another type of change involves strengthening the effectiveness of for-
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mal institutions. By institutional effectiveness, the above-cited authors understand the
probability of speciﬁc formal rules being adopted in practice. Improving the operation
of tax institutions (strengthening the tax ofﬁce’s control, the introduction of PIT and
CIT taxes) undoubtedly contributed to limiting informalmarket turnover and resulted
in the overwhelming majority of today’s business activity being recorded. However,
strengthening the effectiveness of formal institutions may contribute equally well to
the emergence of side effects in the form of informal institutions, which help actors
who disagree with the spirit of law to respect its letter. For example, the reaction
to tightening tax regulations could be that clients, being uncertain of administrative
decisions, privatize their relations with bureaucrats, or that private ﬁrms poach tax
ofﬁcials.
However, there are sources of informal institutional change that are not connected
directly with the formal context (see Williamson 2000). An essential source of this
type of change is, for example, a transformation in the socio-cultural sphere, where
it is a matter of slow and imperceptible changes in values, norms, convictions, or
attitudes. An example here could even be the process of consolidating the private
economy and private business in East-Central Europe during the last twenty-some
years. 7 Another source of change in informal institutions could be a transformation in
the systems of power and the distribution of socially important resources. The gradual
disappearance of the economy of shortage (Kornai 1985) and its replacement by the
free market economy in Poland has caused the disappearance of the institution—
typical of that period—of ‘connections’ and of that group of actorswho, in the previous
system, had access to rare economic resources. 8 Finally, the last type of change
occurs when informal institutions reach a critical mass, that is, the moment in which
the overwhelming majority of actors is convinced ‘this can’t go on’ and produce
a breakthrough in terms of the previously prevailing rules of behaviour, connections,
relations, etc. In Poland, such an event, which changed the rules of politics, was a 2002
corruption scandal known as the Rywin affair; in the opinion of experts, it not only led
to the downfall of Leszek Miller’s government, but also radically changed the manner
in which politics was perceived and received by public opinion.9
In referring to the above discussion we are advancing the thesis that the relations
andbehaviour of actors in the ﬁeld of activity of Polish business are the result of: (1) the
internal dynamics of formal and informal institutions; (2) the mutual interactions of
7 On the concept of ‘long duration’ see Braudel 1999. Cf. North 1990; Williamson 2000. The latter,
distinguishing various determinants of economic behaviour (from institutions of long duration to current
ones) sites informal socio-cultural institutions (habits, traditions, religions) at the most basic level of
institutional inﬂuence, operating within the time frame of 100–1000 years (ibidem, pp. 596–598).
8 We are thinking here of the informal contacts, which, in the communist era, assured access to regulated
and scarce goods. At present, acquaintance facilitates primarily access to information, and also to restricted
services (for instance, medical ones).
9 After the Rywin Affair, and particularly after the revelation of behind-the-scenes political and ad-
ministrative connections as a result of the parliamentary Committee of Enquiry investigation of cases of
corruption during work on amending radio and television broadcasting law, the idea spread of a Fourth
Republic, with postulates for radical changes to the system (cf. Śpiewak 2003). Formerly conﬁned to nar-
row political groups, the idea of a Fourth Republic appeared in the parliamentary elections of 2005 in the
platforms of all the major political parties.
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both types of institutions; and (3) the external (formal and informal) institutional
context. The internal dynamic of formal institutions is connected, in our opinion, with
the historically preserved methods of creating the law regulating economic activity.
In the case of Poland, current events (scandals, affairs), the dependence of the
legislative process on politics, and the non-transparent inﬂuence of various inter-
est groups, favour the emergence of legal chaos and restrictive provisions. In turn,
the internal dynamic of informal institutions is connected with spontaneous adaptive
reactions, which occur, however, in accordance with the cultural patterns ‘at hand’
(Swidler 1986). Thus in functioning within the framework of speciﬁc formal institu-
tions, actors reach for culturally preserved informal patterns of behaviour.At the same
time, the reaction to chaos, ineffectiveness, and restrictive provisions will primarily
be to set in motion culturally preserved patterns of behaviour, which have stood the
test of time: for instance, they were proven effective in the communist period. We
assume, following the suggestions of Lauth (2000), as well as Helmke and Levitski
(2004), that institutions will be set in motion that are substitutive in regards to for-
mal ones (private connections, ‘making friends’ with bureaucrats10), accommodating
(poaching public functionaries), or competitive (favouritism, clientelism, corruption).
Then, the external institutional context—in our case, EU law and the rules of global
competition—will have an inﬂuence on the change of relations and the principles of
operating in the national ﬁeld. On the one hand, it should encourage actors to coop-
erate and to facilitate business activity (complementary institutions), on the other, it
might, however, incline businesspeople to move that activity outside the jurisdiction
of the Polish legal regulations, to other EU (or non-EU) countries, where the formal
rules of the game allow for greater economic effectiveness.
In the empirical part of our article, we want to show the mechanisms by which the
above-mentioned informal institutions are formed. For this purpose, we refer to four
main phenomena:
1. The effect of the highly restrictive provisions regulating business activity in Poland
on the informal relations between public administration and business, with their
antagonizing inﬂuence on these groups and on the divergence in the objectives
they pursue, resulting consequently in the informal institutions regulating business
having a speciﬁc shape—distrust and mutual suspicion;
2. Poor effectiveness of law, which, with the long cultural tradition in regards to
creating the law and attitudes towards the law, considerably favours the produc-
tion of informal accommodating institutions (poaching ofﬁcials) and substitutive
institutions (‘making friends’ in bureaucratic ofﬁces) and competitive institutions
(corruption);
3. The effect of EU law, which, as a partly new and partly alternative framework
for informal institutions, changes the balance of power between the two groups
(entrepreneurs and public ofﬁcials) of interest to us, thus fostering: (1) the appear-
10 It should be added here that even though the use of acquaintance is usually substitutive in nature, that
is, it serves aims that are basically convergent with aims, which, for various reasons, are not achieved by
formal institutions, it may also have an accommodating nature, that is, it may be used to realize aims that
are contrary to the spirit, though not the letter, of the aims realized by formal institutions.
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ance of institutions which are partially substitutive in regards to Polish law, and
partially complementary (facilitating business and cooperation); (2) the departure
of entrepreneurs from their native ‘playing ﬁeld’;
4. Transition in the external context, which inﬂuences the informal institutions regu-
lating business activity in Poland—particularly the impact of the global economy,
which shapes the rules of cooperation between public administration and busi-
ness and generates the emergence of institutions that are substitutive in regard to
unfavourable formal regulations.
The Restrictive Function of Law and the Antagonizing of Groups
in the Field of Business Regulations
As we mentioned earlier, in the case of the ineffectiveness of formal institutions,
informal rulesmay acquire a substitutive form, where they pursue goals in substitution
for the lack or deﬁciency of formal institutions, or an alternative (competitive) form,
where objectives are pursued that are contrary to the ineffective or restrictive formal
regulations (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Kazimierz Frieske writes that ‘in modern
societies, the legal regulations are an important—perhaps the most important—tool
for social change […] they serve to realize speciﬁed social goals. Always?That depends
on whether in fact the introduction of speciﬁc regulations leads to the realization of
the goals the legislators want to achieve’ (Frieske 2001: 13). Let us assume that
if formal institutions are characterized by a bit too much bureaucratization or are
internally contradictory or, on the other hand, are unclear or favour one group of
actors—they will foster the emergence of tensions and conﬂicts in a given ﬁeld. The
above-cited author writes further: ‘Law can play a positive role in maintaining good
attitudes in citizens, but it can also disorient them, incline them to conduct themselves
in accordance with their immediate beneﬁt or to disregard the public interest’ (ibidem,
p. 30). In our opinion, much depends on both the construction of the law itself and
the historical context in which informal institutions are shaped. As Adam Podgórecki
and others have shown, in the communist period, which still marks the present, public
authorities ofﬁcially recognized the law, as a form of public activity, but only on the
premise that it was a facade (Podgórecki 1995). The law played a role in formal
decorum, serving to maintain the integrality of the state party—but precisely because
it might at any moment be used against the citizens.
Similarly, since the beginning of the 1989 transformation, the law has been treated
instrumentally, due to the low political culture of the political elites and the lack of
cohesive ideas for a long-term policy for the good of the state. 11 As Włodzimierz
Wesołowski points out, the perspective of the ruling elites is dominated by the short-
term view, limitedmost often to the next term of ofﬁce, and in consequence politicians
11 It has correctly been pointed out that the current crisis of the state institution is the conseqence of
neglecting—in connection with giving priority to the economic sphere—to plan the political system at the
beginning of the transformation, with the result that the opportunity was missed to build an institution that
would adequately consider the public good in its systemic solutions (see Kamiński & Kamiński 2004: 196–
234).
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are insufﬁciently concerned with the possible effects of the legislation they pass, which
is often dictated by ad-hoc considerations of party tactics. Individual or group interests
predominate (Wesołowski 2004). The legal regulations are insufﬁciently controlled in
terms of their substantive value, including, above all, in regard to the general public
interest. 12 Their excessive number means that state institutions are non-transparent
and inefﬁcient.
It would seem that in many areas the law currently, as in the recent past, functions
more to hinder than to enable citizens’ activities. It does not lead to the facilitation
of business activity, but concentrates on the burdensome control of entrepreneurs.
As a result, the law sets public ofﬁcials and entrepreneurs at one another, and
consequently the two groups’ objectives diverge radically. We advance the thesis that
the law is the most important source of hostility, resentment, and distrust between
public administration and business, which manifests itself in the form of suspicion
toward businesspeople on the one hand and the low esteem in which public ofﬁcials
are held on the other. Generally, we are dealing with mutual suspicion and lack of
cooperation. In addition, both sides operate in various regimes of legal responsibility:
for entrepreneurs, it is individual, direct, immediate, and personal, through the ﬁrm’s
assets and in many cases, the entrepreneur’s own; for public ofﬁcials, it is generalized,
indirect responsibility, deferred, and ﬁnancially limited to 3 or 12 times their salary.13
This difference has an important impact on their mutual relations.
Distrust toward entrepreneurs and business in general is a broader problem in
Poland, exceeding the bounds of the administration-business relation. Poles’ distrust
toward business and businesspeople has remained at a high level. According to the
2010 PBS DGA survey, only 19% of respondents perceive business success as the
result of honest hard work. The same number of persons view it as the result of
bending the law, and 34% see it as the result simply of having the right acquaintances.
Furthermore, almost half the respondents (48%) considered entrepreneurs to be
dishonest (PBS DGA 2010).14
12 On the subject of irregularities in the legislative process see Przejrzystość… [Transparency…] 2008;
Goetz & Zubek 2005; Staśkiewicz 2010.
13 Members of the civil service are liable to disciplinary action on the basis of principles set forth in the
civil service act of 2008 (earlier in the civil service acts of 1996, 1998, and 2006). They are also liable on the
basis of general criminal responsibility (The Criminal Code), as well as ﬁnancial liability on the basis of
provisions of Section V of the Labour Code on the ﬁnancial liability of employees and ﬁnancial liability on
the basis of the act of 2011 on the ﬁnancial liability of public functionaries for ﬂagrant violations of the law.
According to the Ministry of Finance, in 2012 there were no cases of employees of the public adminstration
being held liable on the basis of the above-mentioned laws. One cause of this state of affairs is that the
ﬁnancial liability of employees is recourse liability, meaning that public functionaries can be held liable
only when, on the basis of a ﬁnal court judgement, compensation is paid for damages caused by a ﬂagrant
violation of the law in exercising public authority, resulting from a functionary’s culpable act or omission
(see Niedbał 2013).
14 From research commissioned from the Gfk Polonia Institute for Market and Public Opinion Research
by Rzeczpospolita it appears that Poles’ opinions on entrepreneurs are full of contradictions. Over half
the respondents expressed dislike for the group. In the opinion of the respondents, an entrepreneur is
someone rich and educated, but whose ethical attitude leaves much to be desired. Scarcely one third of the
respondents expressed the conviction that Polish businesspeople honestly pay taxes and observe the law.
Opinions about Polish entrepreneurs still contained stereotypes from communist times (Biały 2006).
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Our interviewees also emphasized the negative attitude of the state toward en-
trepreneurs and the maintenance of a hostile business climate.
An entrepreneur is also a citizen, so, in the end, or maybe at the beginning, that awful suspiciousness of
part of the people in power toward private business should disappear, since private business is undoubtedly
more effective, more efﬁcient, and brings revenue to the state. A bureaucrat does not bring any revenue
to the state—none, you know; enterprises, ﬁrms bring revenues, state-owned ones rarely, in general they
are in arrears with Social Insurance […] But the information is spread in the world, or in Poland, that…
hmm… an entrepreneur, if someone has something, they’re dishonest to begin with.
This general distrust in turn reinforces a negative image of public administration
and public ofﬁcials among entrepreneurs. The quotation below, like many similar
statements, concentrates on the lack of competence of public functionaries, but this so-
called lack of professionalism is, in our opinion, equally the effect of the complicated
and often changing law—which we will discuss further on—and also the relations, full
of reserve and distrust, between business and administration.
Looking back… at the last decade or maybe even earlier, not much has changed […] There are a lot of
incompetent people. The incompetencemanifests itself in that… they…build a protective barrier of various
documents around themselves… Just let there be documents—and there have to be lots of signatures… so
they won’t be responsible for any kind of decision. And this appears… in the most various areas of business
life. In addition, they think up pointless dates, time periods, and so on… they can’t act quickly, give a quick
answer… They aren’t at all competent. They aren’t prepared.
Other quotes stress the formally sanctioned asymmetry between the sides in re-
gards to legal responsibility. This also deepens the distrust of entrepreneurs toward
public administration. The problem is the lack of responsibility for decisions and
information dispensed in various areas of economic life.
I think that [public ofﬁcials] are, ﬁrst, badly informed, and second, they don’t feel accountable for what
they say. They just give out any information and aren’t responsible if they’re wrong or if they misread—they
have nothing to fear on those grounds. They’re anonymous, that’s all.
It should be emphasized that the errors of public ofﬁcials, the giving out of incor-
rect information, and the lack of consequences for wrong decisions have become, for
many entrepreneurs, negative symbols of the functioning of public administration as
a whole. Decisions that have led to the downfall of prospering businesses, particularly
in some of the most publicly discussed cases, have inﬂuenced the respondents’ imag-
inings and shaped their image of public administration as, on the one hand, unfriendly
to business, and on the other, as capable of making decisions at will, even incorrect
ones, without incurring any consequences whatever. 15 Many entrepreneurs are frus-
trated by the functionaries’ lack of accountability for their actions, and particularly by
their incompetence or even off-handedness in making decisions.
15 Asmentioned above, before the entry into force of the act on the ﬁnancial liability of public functionar-
ies, public ofﬁcials were ﬁnancially liable on the bases set forth in the Labour Code. This liability was of
a recourse nature in regard to the State Treasury, while damages for an unintentionally inﬂicted injury could
not exceed three times the ofﬁcial’s monthly salary (in the case where the ofﬁcial had caused the damage
intentionally, he or she was obliged to cover its entire cost). On the basis of the Labour Code there was no
legal obligation to initiate recourse proceedings by entities that had previously paid damages. Because real
perpetrators have comperatively rarely been held liable for damage, the conviction has spread in society
that public ofﬁcials have not at all been held responsible for their acts or omissions. The case of Roman
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Functionaries are so irresponsible and are not held to any account for their actions—and they should be
held responsible—and they endanger an entrepreneur, who is really the one driving this economy; it’s he
who gets up in the morning and works hard, tries to make it all go, to make endsmeet—and this functionary
doesn’t have a clue about work. Really, really. He doesn’t have an idea about real conditions, about any
such… The regulations are so dense and senseless, like they were just made up from nothing…
Unﬂattering opinions are expressed on the subject of public ofﬁcials.
Poles—well, perhaps not all—but I think the majority of Polish functionaries are hindering the country’s
economic development! […] Excessive attention to detail […] because for them what matters is covering
their [behinds]! A functionary has to protect himself, with certiﬁcates, and receipts, and declarations, and
who knows what else. So that if there is some investigation, even if they ﬁnd him, even if his lack of
knowledge, of diligence, say, is discovered, he’ll be surrounded by so many papers that no one can do
anything to him.
It is not only incompetence that is complained of, and the inefﬁciency of pub-
lic functionaries, but also their dilatoriness, which differs from the standards that
entrepreneurs are accustomed to in their business activities.
There is one other thing about the public administration […] Namely, a tax ofﬁce inspection would begin at
one of the ﬁrms—whose names I won’t reveal—at 10:00 a.m. and end at 2:00 p.m. […] So the ineffectiveness
of Poland’s public administration doesn’t lie in its lacking people, but in the fact that its people don’t work
effectively. That’s for starters. I mean, let’s say if you were to come and work, say, from 9:00 a.m. or
10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., what do you do for the other three hours, for goodness sake? That is, if someone in
a public ofﬁce complains that they can’t audit taxpayers because there have too few people, and taxpayers
are unscrupulous, then instead of increasing the number of the ofﬁce’s employees in the form of new tax
controllers, it would be better to make sure the old workers worked 8 hours a day, and not 5.
Excessive and restrictive regulations, as we know from the theoretical discussion,
are often counterproductive. Instead of the expected results, they may produce the
opposite to what was intended. In our case, restrictive, over-detailed regulation of
business activity, often subordinate to current political requirements, has a negative
impact on the work of public administration. The excessive production of legal pro-
visions means that bureaucrats often get lost in their multiplicity and err in their
decisions, and this increases the pressure to which they are subjected and generates
an attitude of self-protection and a natural resentment toward clients. Businesspeople
regard bureaucratic errors as manifestations of incompetence and a lack of profes-
sionalism. In turn, the restrictiveness of regulations is regarded as intended to hinder
business. The consequence is mutual resentment and suspicion. Administrative ofﬁ-
cials defend themselves against complaints; businessmen react with distrust toward
bureaucrats, and indirectly, toward the state as a whole. Thus lack of trust becomes
a permanent, informal element of relations between entrepreneurs and the state
administration.
Kluska, among others, contributed to this belief. The act on the ﬁnancial liability of public functionaries
for ﬂagrant violation of the law, adopted in 2011, provides for the recourse liability of the functionary
in regard to the State Treasury for unintentionally inﬂicted damage to the amount of up to 12 times the
functionary’s monthly salary (in the case of an intentional injury, in the full amount), as well as introducing
the obligation, under criminal penalty, of the director of the organizational unit to apply to the regional
prosecutor’s ofﬁce for investigatory proceedings. The introduction of new legal mechanisms intended to
reinforce the rule of law in the settlement of administrative cases; however, the comparatively brief period
in which the law has been in force does not allow any conclusions to be drawn as to its effectiveness.
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Ineffectiveness of Formal Institutions
Poland’s legal regulations for doing business are overly complicated, as Piotr Sz-
tompka observes in describing the state of the law and its social effects in the middle
of the 1990s:
The general feeling of uncertainty is also due to normative disorganization or anomie. The legal system is
a fragmented mosaic of partial regulations, old and new, often inconsistent, repeatedly changed, and arbi-
trarily interpreted. The overload of rules, regulations, administrative codes, and conﬂicting interpretation
of laws makes them incomprehensible […]. The rule of law is compromised by extra-legal decisions of the
highest authorities, including the presidential ofﬁce, and by the retroactive legislation occasionally passed
by the parliament. Trust in the continuity, stability, and orderliness of social life is effectively undermined
(Sztompka 1999: 177).
After ﬁfteen years, the legal regulations are still far from transparent (see, inter
alia, Przejrzystość… [Transparency…] 2008; Goetz & Zubek 2005; Staśkiewicz 2010;
Kochanowski 2005; Kochanowski 2008). They thereby lose their regulatory power;
they become discretionary, chaotic, and in consequence—ineffective. The nontrans-
parency of legal regulations produces uncertainty both on the side of the functionaries
and of the entrepreneurs. This necessitates the emergence of accommodating institu-
tions (private connections, poaching functionaries) or competitive institutions (high
rotation of ofﬁcials, corruption).
In the 2014 Doing Business report, Poland is placed in 45th position among
189 countries in terms of ease of doing business. In the years 2007–2012 the World
Bank placed Poland somewhat lower. It was only the ranking of 2013 that showed
a jump upwards, although unfortunately this still does not signify a clear qualitative
change. The table below depicts the tendency. 16
Table 1
Poland in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index (Doing Business 2006–2014)
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Poland’s rank 54 75 74 76 72 70 62 55 45
Number of countries 155 175 178 181 183 183 183 185 189
According to the 2014 Doing Business report, Poland’s most signiﬁcant improve-
ment in recent years has occurred in two areas. It is now easier to start a business
(Poland moved up to 116th position). The reforms included simplifying the start up of
a business by reducing the minimum amount of capital required for a limited liability
company from PLN 50,000 to 5,000 and consolidating applications to the National
Court Register for registration, tax, social security, and statistics (the so-called ‘single
counter’ reform)—both in 2009—and eliminating the requirement to register a new
company at the National Labour Inspectorate and the National Sanitary Inspectorate
(2013). However, despite the ‘single counter’, starting a company still takes 30 days
16 Hereinafter the statistics for each year are quoted from the original data sets.
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on average and is expensive (14.3% of per-capita income, while the OECD average
for high-income countries is 3.6%). Another signiﬁcant improvement involves dealing
with construction permits (up to 88th place in 2014). As reported by the World Bank,
an average application now requires 18 procedures and 161 days to complete, which
is a major step forward when compared to 301 days and 29 procedures in the previous
year. However, the number of procedures and bodies that are still involved, as well
as the lack of local spatial-management plans in many places in Poland, may make
the whole process much longer and more strenuous for investors. At the same time,
registering property has become easier. The process currently takes an average of
35 days and 6 procedures, compared to 152 days in 2012 and 204 days in 2005. In the
2013 report, theWorld Bank noted that property registration had beenmade faster by
introducing a new caseload management system for the land and mortgage registries,
as well as by continuing to digitize the records of the registries.
The 2014 report stressed that over the last two years paying taxes has been simpli-
ﬁed for businesses. However, Poland still ranks only at 113th place in this regard—tax
burdens are high and requiremuch time and effort. The total tax rate is 41.6% (almost
average for OECD high-income countries). In a ‘standardized’ company17 analyzed
by the World Bank, 286 hours are spent annually on making the required 18 payments
(with an OECD average of 175 hours spent on 12 payments). Despite Poland’s low
rankings, the situation in regard to taxes has signiﬁcantly improved, considering that
until 2010, the requisite 40 payments took an average of 395 hours of work, and earlier
even as long as 418 hours.
Poland provides fairly good institutional possibilities for trading across borders
(49th place in the 2014 Doing Business). Exporting a standard container of goods
requires 5 documents, takes 17 days, and costs $1050, while importing the same
container of goods requires 4 documents, takes 14 days, and costs $1025, which is
only a few days longer than the OECD high-income countries’ average. The 2013
report saw a major leap in enforcing contracts (56th place, up to 55th in 2014): average
proceedings last much less long than previously (685 days in 2014 instead of 830 in
2010, or even 1000 still in 2004; the whole process currently includes 480 days for
trial and judgment) and requires fewer necessary procedures (33 instead of 37 in
prior years). In terms of protecting investors (minority shareholders against directors’
use of power for their own gain or self-dealing), the World Bank ranks Poland in
52nd place, above the OECD high-income average (in 56th place). Entrepreneurs in
Poland must go through a very long and costly process to get electricity (137th place—
161 days in Warsaw according to the 2014 report), which, alongside taxes, is still one
of Poland’s weakest points. On the other hand, Poland is one of the world’s leaders
in the availability and ease of getting credit (3rd place in 2014).
Ironically for current businesses, Poland improved in resolving insolvency (up from
87th place in 2012 to 37th in the 2013 and 2014 reports), thanks to institutional changes
allowing for an increase in the recovery rate, from 31–36 cents on the dollar to just be-
low55 cents on the dollar in the 2014 index (formore see:DoingBusiness 2013&2014).
17 A typical ‘standardized company’ in the report is a Limited Liability Company located in Warsaw.
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As appears from the above data, Poland’s increasingly high relative position in
the ranking is something more than just the effect of change and ﬂuctuation in other
countries included in the ranking. Its gradual climb results from the introduction
of desirable—although, unfortunately, most often not revolutionary—changes in the
institutional sphere of the business environment. The best example could be the area
of taxation, described below, which has been made more effective in recent years,
with a signiﬁcantly shorter time designated for tax accounting and also less activities
needed for the purpose (although it continues to be a large organizational challenge
and difﬁculty for entrepreneurs). Therefore, in the area of formal regulations, as
a result of accession to the European Union, a gradual but consistent convergence is
being made between Poland’s regulations and EU law. However, as data still shows,
Polish law is far from being simple and transparent in the area of business regulations.
Functionaries—Stewards of Administrative Decisions or Victims of Bad Law?
This objective data ﬁnds solid support in the empirical material we have collected. In
the opinion of our respondents, the effect of complicated laws is that interpretations
of provisions are varying and not infrequently divergent. Particularly before 2007,
the different and often contradictory interpretations of the tax law were a plague,
hampering the daily running of business and, worse, introducing uncertainty and
reducing trust in the legal regulations, public administration, and the state as a whole.
It should be emphasized that in the last few years several very important changes in
the tax regulations were introduced: above all in connection with the adoption of the
so-called deregulatory law and the packet for business development. In 2006, a major
effort was made to resolve the problem of the blatant inconsistencies connected with
the issuing of divergent interpretations of the tax law by various tax ofﬁces. On the
basis of the law of 16 November 2006 on changing the law—the Tax Code and on the
amendment of certain other laws (Journal of Law 2006, no. 217, pos. 1590) and the
decree of the Minister of Finance of 20 June 2007 on authorization to issue individual
interpretations of provisions of the tax law (Journal of Law 2007, no. 112, pos. 770
with later amendments), since 1 July 2007 interpretation of the tax law is made,
within certain limits, by the directors of the tax ofﬁces in Katowice, Warsaw, Poznań,
Bydgoszcz, and, since 1 April 2011, also in Łódź, in the name of the minister. For the
purpose of ensuring uniform application of the tax law by the tax organs and the tax
inspection authorities, in addition to individual interpretations issued in response to
taxpayer applications, the Minister of Finance issues general interpretations (also on
taxpayer application, ex ofﬁcio and since 1 January 2012 in connection with the entry
into force of the law of 16 September 2011 on the reduction of certain obligations
of citizens and entrepreneurs [Journal of Law, no. 232, pos. 1378]). Only 30 of these
general interpretations were issued in the period from July 2007 to the end of 2011
and 44 to the end of 2012 (our own calculations on the basis of data from the Ministry
of Finance). Unfortunately, contradictory individual interpretations by the tax ofﬁces
are still a problem, as is their frequent low quality. In the years 2010–2012, around
2,500 interpretations were contested (of more than 30,000 issued in 2010 and over
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36,000 in 2011) which constitutes, depending on the tax ofﬁce, between 5% and 11%
of all the interpretations issued. Over half were overturned by the court (see Molik
2012). In spite of systemic improvement in access to a rapid and transparent individual
interpretation of the tax law since 2007, the institution of individual interpretations is
unable to repair the basic faults of a system lacking good and reliable tax laws.
In 2009, another very important change for entrepreneurs was introduced in the
Tax Code:18 the principle of the taxpayer’s presumed honesty. On the strength of this
principle, the decision of an inferior tax authority (that is, one from which there is
a means of appeal in the normal course of proceedings) imposing on the taxpayer
a tax obligation enforceable by administrative proceedings cannot be enforced unless
it was granted immediate enforceability. Additionally, in the case of a complaint being
made to the administrative court, and on the fulﬁlment of certain conditions, the tax
authority of the ﬁrst instance must refrain from enforcement of a ﬁnal decision until
the moment the decision acquires force of law. In the earlier state of law, a taxpayer’s
appeal to a second instance of a tax authority’s decision on the amount of tax due
did not stop the enforcement of the decision, thus forcing the tax to be paid. In this
manner, the incorrect decisions of tax ofﬁcials caused the bankruptcy of numerous
companies before their decisions could be overturned by the courts.
However, in spite of the detailed legal regulations, a great deal still rests with the
individual tax ofﬁcial.
The law should be transparent, legible, and unambiguous, not ambiguous. Then it could work. Now there
are no proper, unambiguous laws; on every subject it is necessary to seek the opinion of several lawyers.
Even government ofﬁces, in relation to the same matter, make various contradictory decisions depending
on the person. It’s tragic, because an entrepreneur doesn’t know what he’s supposed to do.
In connection with the possibility of various readings of the laws, entrepreneurs
often complain about the arbitrary interpretation and application of the laws by
government ofﬁces.
I wouldn’t complain about the regulations themselves although… the law… although it is very lame in my
opinion, well… Well, like everything… It’s necessary again, in this… area also, it is necessary to make up
for lost time. On the other hand, the worst is the free interpretation of the law by government ofﬁces. And
its ambiguity. Because it can drive a person mad, because… there was a series of such questions where…
the Tax Ofﬁce in Bielsko, for instance, had a contrary opinion to the Tax Ofﬁce in Opole, and… and it was
a matter of the VAT. And now, they threatened us… one way or another the ﬁne was inevitable, because
if we counted that VAT or not, it would have been wrong. Because the sub-contractors were in Opole,
and we… we’re under the Bielsko ofﬁce. So, such things can’t be… because then it really is… It simply
encourages a person to break the law… and not to observe it.
Similar problems, which existed until recently, connected with the de facto lack of
possibility of appealing the decisions of tax ofﬁcials, were discussed by another person
running a company.
The question of interpretation, for instance… such provisions, such as what happens in the case of a dispute
arising between a taxpayer and a tax ofﬁce…are regulated differently in every ofﬁce. That is, we have I don’t
18 On the basis of the law of 7 November 2008 on amending the law—The Tax Code and certain other
laws (Journal of Law 2008, no. 209, pos. 1318), which entered into force on 1 January 2009.
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know how many different interpretations of the same provision; that’s in general some sort of complete
senselessness, that is…we can’t even refer to some precedence; let’s say… that, for instance, some tax ofﬁce
somewhere… Because this tax ofﬁce has a completely different approach and… we don’t have anything
that would actually be… a reasonable means of appeal. That is, if I don’t agree with this interpretation
then… Actually, what can I do? All right, there’s the Supreme Administrative Court, right? But so what?…
Really no one in a matter of, say, the two-thousand-zlotys cost of acquiring revenue monthly is going to go
to the trouble of the administrative court. There isn’t any intermediate sort of possibility of appeal…
The possibility of various legal interpretations could lead to absurd situations,
which one of the respondents described as ‘over-interpretation of the law’, that is,
applying the most restrictive interpretation of the regulations. It can be supposed that
the cause is the desire to secure one’s own decisions, position, and ofﬁce from being
suspected of too liberal an application of the law. Perhaps it is also the result of the
fear of accusations of favouring some actors and in consequence being suspected of
corruption.
I think it’s a matter here of the over-interpretation of the law, because, for instance, investment law is very
complicated in Poland. That is, if you want to build something for your ﬁrm—I wouldn’t wish that on my
worst enemy. Really, I experienced it twice already, and there are barriers here—but often it is also the
over-interpretation of the law by a public ofﬁcial, who could close his eyes to certain things, because in
another ofﬁce they say something different. That is, it could be done, but no, this bureaucrat will say that it
has to be like he says […]. Contrary to what could appear, environmental requirements are more onerous,
because it’s known that a construction project has to be good, so that nothing will collapse, everything has
to be good, there are certain procedures, there are time periods, and all that—I understand that it has to be
that way, because it has to be safe, but if we’re talking about getting into an industrial investment, then the
department of environmental protection enters in and makes conditions, and they don’t always interpret
the matter the way it could be done. The investment process in Poland is very complicated.
The liberty of action, the lack of speciﬁc interpretations, and various manners of
interpreting the same regulations by different ofﬁces results in entrepreneurs feeling
lost and uncertain, alone against the bureaucraticmachine. Numerous examples could
be cited here of entrepreneurs wronged by the state and of government ofﬁces making
use of their dominant position.19
Entrepreneurs complain that it is difﬁcult for them to navigate through the ever-
changing regulatory thicket. Complicated provisions, scattered through various laws,
give bureaucrats the ability to impose punishment on practically every entrepreneur.
Given the height of the possible ﬁnes, to bring a company to the brink of bankruptcy
does not seem difﬁcult.
Unfortunately, an army of functionaries and fairly simple-minded parliamentarians have created in the
meanwhile such bureaucratic barriers that are difﬁcult to get through and overcome […] Actually, today no
honest entrepreneur is certain whether he isn’t from time to time breaking some law or other: the law is so
complicated. Having the best intentions in the world, we aren’t certain that if someone looks he won’t ﬁnd
19 Among the most symptomatic and widely discussed cases were the bringing to bankruptcy of the
computer potentates JTT and Optimus (cf., for instance, Górecki 2013; Fisher 2002), the textile ﬁrm New
Knitting (cf., for instance, Solska 2003), the automotive company Polmozbyt Krakow (cf., for instance,
Królak 2011), or the meat-processing plants of Krakmeat (cf., for instance, Czuchnowski, Sidorowicz 2010;
Cieński 2010; Isakiewicz 2011). Some of these cases ended with awards of high damages for bureaucratic
errors, as in the case of the legal battle of the JTT ﬁrm, which lasted for years (cf. Górecki 2013). Unfortu-
nately, such sentences are delivered years after the fact and ordinarily after an enterprise’s bankruptcy or
major decline in value.
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something thatwe unintentionally overlooked. I’ll give you a simple example: if one ofmy employees doesn’t
take his vacation at the right time, and someone of themany inspectors decides—and I suppose over a dozen
institutions could investigate us—that I’ve violated his rights, that I’m a bad entrepreneur, a bad boss, they
can slap a ﬁne on me on the order of, say, a hundred thousand zlotys. If it’s twenty employees, that would
be a sum that could bring down a company. And the point is, it’s not applied at all, but such tools are given
to functionaries that they could ruin very many enterprises if they wanted to. In accordance with the law.
The example, reported in the media, of a baker from Legnica whom the tax au-
thorities decided in 2006 owed 200,000 zlotys in unpaid VAT tax from 2003 was also
mentioned. As a result of the dispute with the ﬁscal authorities the company went
bankrupt, and the media presented the entrepreneur as a victim of a soulless bureau-
cracy, which had hunted down a charitable entrepreneur who had been donating his
leftover bread to a canteen for the poor (seeMułek 2010;Darowany chleb… [Donated
Bread…] 2010).
It’s like with that VAT for those buns, which liquidated the bakery. A man gave the bread he hadn’t sold
to poor people for free, and for that they calculated he owed some hundreds of thousands in VAT—look
how stupid that is, how senseless. And there are quite a lot of such obstacles.
Even though, in the end, according to the ﬁscal authorities, and also according to
the Supreme Administrative Court (ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of
28 January 2010, act signature I FSK 1895/08), the matter concerned larger and more
serious tax irregularities than just donated bread for the poor,20 such examples act
on the imagination of entrepreneurs and increase their fear of bureaucracy and the
unpredictability of bureaucratic decisions.
Another result of Poland’s complicated and unclear laws is the rotation in public
administrative positions. The multiplicity, complexity, and variability of regulations
require functionaries to have experience and high qualiﬁcations. Larger ﬁrms, par-
ticularly those that do business in EU countries, poach the best public ofﬁcials. Their
places are taken by inexperienced persons. In turn, increased rotation causes a low-
ering of the average level of competence among personnel as a result of the limited
knowledge and acquaintance with the regulations of persons entering the job.
The staffs of public ofﬁces are characterized by a high degree of rotation. It shouldn’t be like that, because
there is a continuity to the activities of every bureaucratic position and every change means beginning from
the start. There are very many young, inexperienced people who are permitted to do things that are not
infrequently very arrogant, but they have no knowledge. The result is that they pile up difﬁculties, they’re
afraid of everything, they don’t know how to make decisions. In those important bureaucratic positions,
where large amounts of money come in, there should be competent people. For example, EU projects, of
which we’ve done a lot—I could say we dictated to them how it was supposed to be, and they were still
afraid to make a decision. And inexperienced companies have a huge problem because of this; every young
entrepreneur complains about functionaries, the system of accounting, the regulations, etc.
Such a diagnosis is conﬁrmed by research according to which the rotation of
personnel in public ofﬁces constitutes a serious problem for Poland’s public adminis-
tration. According to data of the PrimeMinister’s Ofﬁce, the average level of turnover
20 A baker who gave part of his unsold bread to the poor was charged by the tax ofﬁce with having failed
to pay the VAT on donations. However, as the Supreme Administrative Court emphasized in its ruling, this
tax was only a small percentage of the tax due in the dispute; the matter concerned rather the improper
recording of turnover.
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in the civil service corps in 2007 was 12.8%. In voivodeship ofﬁces the level of rotation
in the staff exceeded 20% at the same time. There were, however, ofﬁces in which
the level of ﬂuctuation was signiﬁcantly higher—in the General Inspectorate of Road
Transport it reached 70% (System wynagrodzeń [The Pay System] 2009). 21
Research into the use of EU funds in Poland leads to similar conclusions. The
human barriers constitute one of the basic and most lasting problems of Poland’s ad-
ministration as a whole. However, the mirror reﬂection of the fall in competence and
qualiﬁcations of bureaucratic personnel is the growth in competence in the sphere of
economic regulations in the private sector. Well-trained functionaries leave for em-
ployment in business, where their knowledge and experience is considerably better
paid, and the career possibilities are broader (Bukowski,Gadowska, Polak 2008b: 451–
452). 22
The complicated and continually changing law constitutes, on the one hand, a dan-
ger for bureaucrats, because it facilitates the making of errors, as was mentioned, and
on the other hand, it is a source of power over clients, as a result of the functionaries’
liberty in interpretation, their discretion, and also their possessing greater knowledge
than their counterparts in terms of knowing the regulations. In order to equalize the
relations of power in the business ﬁeld, entrepreneurs adopt various strategies.
Connections, Lobbying, ‘Soft Corruption’
Public administration, both at the central and the local level, is perceived to be one of
the country’s most corrupt sectors, and for a long time has ranked below only politics
and the health service in public opinion (see CBOS [Social Opinion Research Center]
2010).According to aCBOS study of 2010, an increasing number of Poles consider that
corruption is most widespread in district, powiat, and voivodeship ofﬁces. In 2010, the
number was 31%, in 2009 28%, while in 2007 only 25% (CBOS 2009, 2010). A further
26%, slightly less than in the preceding years, pointed in 2010 to the existence of
corruption in central government ofﬁces and ministries (CBOS 2010). As expected, in
spite of such a clearly established negative opinion of the administration, our research
has shown that entrepreneurs very seldom addressed the problem of corruption in
the narrow sense (as passive or active bribery) in relations with public administration.
Many respondents referred rather to general knowledge acquired from the media
and other persons, and not to their own business experience. 23 Statements such as
the one below were characteristic.
21 Further on the subject of irregularities in the public administration see Gadowska 2010b. See also
Wynagrodzenia w administracji publicznej [Public Administration Pay] 2006.
22 On this subject, see also Bukowski, Gadowska, Polak 2008a.
23 We will not attempt, here, to determine to what degree the lack of reference to experience of corrupt
practices could indicate that the problem of corruption is not so markedly present in the business activities
of Polish entrepreneurs, and to what degree it testiﬁes to understandable unwillingness and reasonable
fears of disclosing and discussing such instances in an interview situation. Researchers into corruption
have long pointed to the difﬁculties connected with estimating the actual extent and intensity of the
phenomenon. There are no objective statistics on corruption. Answers to survey questions indicate the
widespread appearance of the phenomenon, while answers to questions about speciﬁc instances with which
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They say that’s the way it is, but I’ve never come across it. If someone does it, then it’s done without leaving
ﬁngerprints and no one knows about it.
Several entrepreneursmentioned solely the problems they hadmet doing business
in countries recently admitted to the EU—Bulgaria and Romania, which are still held
to be corrupt.
Another informal institution which our research uncovered is unregistered lob-
bying. The respondents stressed the importance of calling on connections in the
highest business circles, giving examples of politically well-connected entrepreneurs
who lobby for speciﬁc legal solutions for business.
In doing business on a large scale it is without doubt the case everywhere; that’s where such lobbyists
as Mr Dochnal or others come from; they aren’t persons no one knows; everyone knows what it’s about,
generally, if it’s about ﬁlling a position, you hear of it all the time, while at the lower level, at the voivodeship
level, frankly, I don’t have to, I don’t need to, perhaps I never was in such a situation, that doesn’t mean
I’m a saint, only perhaps I just never had the need to make use of connections, links—to who knows
what, but those are things that exist, have existed, and will exist in the future, and there’s no way to
eliminate it.
In spite of the negative connotations attached to the use of connections by larger
entrepreneurs, hastening a bureaucratic matter or even avoiding the regulations
thanks to connections was justiﬁed by some businessmen, or treated as a neces-
sity or even as something natural. Symptomatic was the response of a Świętokrzyskie
entrepreneur, who, to the question of whether having acquaintances in government
ofﬁces in Poland was useful, answered unequivocally:
You ask me such indiscreet questions… I think good acquaintances are necessary.
Many entrepreneurs simply spoke of the large role played by acquaintance, which
can facilitate doing business—for instance, enable the hastening of a matter or even
getting around certain procedures in public ofﬁces. Connections thus pave the way
through the jungle of complicated regulations and formal, bureaucratic requirements.
Whether under the table or not… Sometimes if one knows someone, shall we say, it’s easier to get
whatever done quicker… if one knows somebody, some ofﬁces somewhere, or something… then… that
certain procedure can be got around, whatever it is can be done faster.
It would seem that getting close to public functionaries, particularly those at
the local level, with whom there are regular contacts, can be treated as an attempt
to break through the bureaucracy and formalism—on the one hand, due to rigid
procedures, and on the other, in a situation of uncertainty and the considerable
unpredictability of functionaries’ work. Quotes from the interviews reﬂect this situa-
tion.
Of course, it’s pleasant to go to someone one knows, because then that person will try harder to get the
thing done, but that’s rather not what is being suggested—rather not that. […] It’s not a matter here of
the respondent has met have resulted in a large fall in the indicators for the prevalence of corruption and
susceptibility to corruption (cf., for instance, Czapiński 1999).
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making use of acquaintance; I’m just saying that, for instance, if you go for the twentieth time about some
matter to the same lady in the counter, then automatically that lady says hello to you when she sees you
coming from a distance, and the matter is taken care of differently than if you go to someone you’re seeing
for the ﬁrst time. So it’s more on that basis.
Acquaintances and good relations with local authorities can prove very helpful
in the daily running of a business. One of the respondents, from the Podkarpackie
voivodeship, spoke of the dilatoriness of public ofﬁcials, who deal with applications
and issue decisions at the legally last possible moment. The way to hasten an affair is
by the intervention of the functionary’s immediate superiors or representatives of the
authorities.
Every Polish functionary has a certain amount of time in which to consider an application—two weeks,
a month. […] There are situations where a functionary could make a decision, a simple decision, on
the ﬁrst day. They always wait to the last day, that is, we’re already a month later. That is, they
most often wait, because, you know, here I make a call to the mayor and the next day they write me
that I have to do something or other. But that’s the result of intervention, not the custom of bureau-
crats.
Decisions are taken in accordance with the law; the problem, however, is the
necessity of intervention—as in the case of the district mayor above—to hasten the
procedure. Sometimes that ‘hastening the procedure’ occurs at the cost of other
applicants who are waiting for an administrative decision. Even if it does not happen
at the cost of others (whichmarks it as a ‘soft form of corruption’)many administrative
decisions are the result of personal intervention and not of an impersonal procedure.
One way or another, the results of our research show that these are precisely good
relations with the authorities and high representatives of the administration, both at
the local and the central level, that often constitute the key to running a company
efﬁciently, unhampered by bureaucratic decisions.
To summarize: as a result of the simultaneous restrictiveness and complexity of
the law, a sphere of informal personal contacts spreads between entrepreneurs and
functionaries. The nature of these contacts is undergoing a certain change, how-
ever. Giving bribes is currently connected with ever greater risk. However, ‘private
connections’, that is, making use of personal connections or maintaining direct ac-
quaintanceship with public functionaries, is becoming increasingly more pronounced.
This phenomenon could be described as a manifestation of ‘soft corruption’ in the
relations of business and public administration.24 Such soft and hard-to-pin-down
corruption takes the form of the creation of a network of mutual assistance, which
the participants could consider to be something normal and positive, helping them
overcome the thicket of regulations, the bureaucracy, and the dilatoriness of public
ofﬁces. Thus a sphere of institutions is formed parallel to the ineffective ofﬁcial in-
stitutions. They constitute, however, a sort of pathology, excluding ‘outsiders’—ﬁrms
from outside the district or region, ﬁrms without connections, new entrepreneurs, or
competition from abroad.
24 It can be imagined, however, that this assistance could occur at the cost of other participants, and serve
to ‘oil’ the badly functioning system (Merton 2002).
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Accession to the European Union: Formal and Informal Consequences
The result of Poland’s accession to the European Union has been dual in terms of
relations between public ofﬁcials and entrepreneurs. First, accession has led to succes-
sive changes in Polish law. The EU, at least indirectly, has required the simpliﬁcation
of provisions and the transparency of audit principles. At the same time, accession
made it easier for entrepreneurs to do business abroad and paved the way for the
comparison of regulations in Poland and other EU countries. This has changed the
balance of power in relations between public functionaries and businesspeople (Bour-
dieu and Wacquant 2006). The need to adapt the Polish legal regulations to those
prevailing throughout the EU and the need to increase the competitiveness of Polish
entrepreneurs beginning to do business in the EU market has resulted in a series
of changes to the administrative regulations for doing business. Here in particular it
should be stressed that there have been major changes to the legal regulations in the
question of auditing businesses in order to improve conditions and often simply to
enable the normal functioning of business.
The ﬁrst simpliﬁcation was introduced in 2004. In accordancewith art. 82, section 1
of the Act of 2 July 2004 on the Freedom of Economic Activity (Journal of Law 2004,
no. 173, pos. 1807 with later amendments, uniform text: Journal of Law 2013, no. 0,
pos. 672) it is not possible to initiate and conduct more than one audit in a company
at a time; thanks to this, the practice of various authorities conducting several audits
simultaneously, in the form of ‘raids’ on selected ﬁrms, has been curbed. Succeeding
important changes appeared in 2009 together with the amendment of the act on the
Freedom of Economic Activity introduced by the act of 19 December 2008 (Journal
of Law 2009, no. 18, pos. 97), which contained, among other things, the principles
for conducting nearly all audits. Limitations were introduced to the extent of audits
and to the tax ofﬁce’s discretion in their performance, including the institution of
notiﬁcation of an intended audit, whereby an entrepreneur must be informed that an
audit is to occur and the audit must take place within 7 to 30 days of notiﬁcation. The
length of time within a calendar year during which an enterprise can undergo auditing
was decidedly shortened as well: previously it amounted to 4 weeks (8 weeks at the
largest ﬁrms). Presently, depending on the size of the ﬁrm, it cannot exceed 12working
days in micro-enterprises, 18 working days in small enterprises, 24 days in medium-
size ﬁrms, and 48 days in the remaining enterprises. Evidence from misconducted
audits cannot be used as evidence in cases against entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs
can object to the tax authorities’ undertaking and execution of activities violating
certain provisions of the law on the freedom of economic activity, thus resulting in
the cessation of auditing from the moment the tax authority receives notiﬁcation of
the objection until the objection has been examined. In addition, entrepreneurs who
incur losses as a result of tax audits occurring in violation of the provisions are entitled
to compensation (cf. also Welsyng 2009).
An overgrown bureaucracy, high taxes, and unstable law were often indicated as
important factors causing Polish entrepreneurs to move their businesses to other EU
countries. The respondents contrasted the discretion of Polish public functionaries
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with the more formalized, and simultaneously clearer, procedures in other EU coun-
tries. They also regarded accomplishing administrative matters in other EU countries
as easier. There, there are:
… simpler principles, you don’t have such broad interpretations; everything is clear and is applied just as it’s
written. The public ofﬁcial is always competent, and even if he doesn’t know something, he’ll know where
to turn. The public ofﬁcial is there for the applicant, and not the opposite, while in Poland—it depends on
which functionary you land with.
For many entrepreneurs the certainty and predictability of procedures is the key
trait they expect from a properly functioning public administration. They ﬁnd such
traits in ofﬁces in EU countries, where contacts with ofﬁcials are often reduced to
a minimum.
There, nothing can be hastened. There, everything is so transparent—you just go and everyone knows how
long it will take—and that’s the way it should be. But there it really is quick.
As a model of transparent regulations and straightforward bureaucratic function-
ing, entrepreneurs from the Podkarpackie voivodeship held up not only Germany,
but also England, France, and even—although it may seem surprising given popular
convictions—Italy.
There it is very simple; the provisions are short, legible, there’s practically only a table, where you have to
ﬁll in the appropriate spaces, put in the numbers, and you’re done. [Functionaries] are very competent;
they’re unambiguous, mature, and know what to do. Of course, there are restrictive provisions, too, but
they’re legible, clear, and available to everyone. At any level of knowledge, you can understand them. Here
in Poland, court specialists and experts have various opinions on the same subject. That’s tragic, because if
Poland can’t ﬁnd powers-that-be who understand the economy and if they don’t make legible regulations
it will stay like it is now: ‘it’s easier to swim in murky water’. But the point is to create an effective, growing
economy, which is competitive with other countries.
The difference in the very logic of the public administration’s functioning was
pointed out. Attempts to hasten the course of proceedings in an informal manner
through the help of an administrative superior or through pleas directed at the per-
sonnel themselves, which characterize daily relations with bureaucracy in Poland, are
considered to be impossible in the countries of the ‘old EU’. According to our inter-
viewees, bureaucratic work there is characterized by punctuality, is very formalized,
and does not allow the client-applicant to inﬂuence procedures. In Poland:
If some paper lies in an administrative ofﬁce for a long time, the matter has to be moved on by telephone
calls—‘what’s happening? etc.’ ‘could you look into it?’ as a priority, naturally. […] I think that abroad,
particularly in [EU countries], nothing can be hastened, because everything has its order, but on the other
hand, you can be sure that if there is a set length of time for an administrative ofﬁce to deal with a matter,
it will be dealt with, while here that’s not the case, which is why one has to make those telephone calls.
Thework ofwesternEuropean counterparts looks particularly good in comparison
to the Polish public administration. The effectiveness and speed of administrative
ofﬁces in EU countries is particularly emphasized. The example ofGermany is spoken
of in superlatives.
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Abroad, I had very brief contact with bureaucrats—when founding companies; later, everything is done by
mail, one practically doesn’t go to administrative ofﬁces. Everything is done by mail, by fax, by telephone,
maybe by writing. It works very efﬁciently. Only with us it’s like this—if something needs to be clariﬁed
you have to go to the ofﬁce; you have to make an appointment. Here, you’re working, but you have to
go at a speciﬁc hour to the administrative ofﬁce, and once there you have to wait, because, let’s say, the
functionary has appointments with who-knows-how-many people, because she’s working too. And there
[in Germany] it’s not like that. If you have an appointment, it has to happen, but here—not yet… You
write, you don’t write, you always have to go personally and you have to waste time, instead of working.
An example of long procedures and bureaucratic difﬁculties even at the beginning
of doing business was given by one entrepreneur who complained of the superﬁciality
of the facilitations, such as the so-called ‘single window’, for establishing a business.
There in Germany you simply don’t wait, you act. And here, for instance, I can’t do anything without that
business registry number, which I get in the mail after a month or a month and a half. And in Germany,
you’re working—they give the number, it comes and either something else needs to be ﬁlled in there or
needs to be given to the administrative ofﬁce. But a person is already working there [while waiting for the
registry number] and here in Poland you have to have everything ﬁrst and only then can you begin. For
example—the stupid telephone—I can’t get a telephone for the company without the registry number. In
my opinion, that’s stupidity.
Capitalism, Public Administration, Business: New Rules of the Game?
The context of globalization makes political success at the central, regional, and
local levels dependent on the economic situation, and thereby connects the fates of
politicians and businessmen.We are thus dealing on the one handwith the appearance
of parallel ﬁelds of activity, as mentioned earlier, and on the other with the emergence
of common domains, thanks to which the common intentions, narratives, and values
of businessmen and public ofﬁcials could be formed. It is worth taking a closer look
at this subject.
In the interviews we conducted, the very important role of local governments
in creating a favourable business environment was pointed out. A good illustration
of this, for example, is Rybnik, a city in the Silesian voivodeship, which created
a special economic zone for investors, thus attracting large foreign producers (among
other things, of automotive parts and heaters), and in their wake, other, smaller
entrepreneurs, often producing sub-assemblies for the larger companies.
There are two different things… there’s the business climate in… in cities and the general climate… the
regulations, various things hampering that activity… there are maybe even various behaviours, some sort
of habits, various bureaucrats or institutions. It’s another subject in the cities. In cities the situation is
different… Generally, it all depends on the town; for instance, here in Rybnik there’s a super business
climate. And from the beginning of my working here, we always had help in every instance—always, as
much as the town could help us […] But Rybnik in all those rankings is… always in one of the top places.
The importance of effective local government was often emphasized. It is not
the national government, but the local authorities, who, with competent and efﬁcient
people, can create a positive atmosphere for conducting and increasing economic ac-
tivity, lessening the inconsistencies created by the law and the central administration.
Friendly local administration can create an excellent business climate.
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You know, the process is long and it seems to me, nevertheless, I would dare to claim, that it [should]
change from the top, although in reality the good changes are happening at the bottom. Here the local
governments are the most important; what we’ve managed to achieve, it’s the local governments; that is,
after ’89 Poland’s biggest success is that, in towns, wherever someone intelligent has appeared in the ranks
of the mayors or wójtów [local administrators], then those towns have developed very much. Wrocław is
a good example; Poznań is probably a good example, hmm… a lot of small localities.
One respondent, the head of a large Silesian ﬁrm, gave the example of investment
to expand the enterprise, when the main barrier was the central administration, which
delayed the investment process in spite of the ﬁrm’s previously obtained permits and
agreements at the regional level.
Thus I would dare to claim that the higher you go—the worse. Why?—Because in Katowice we still… got
along well, I know that situation from the period of building, creating our factory in Gliwice […] Well, and
here at the voivodeship level everything went smoothly; the people were very helpful, both in the Gliwice
sub-zone and in the Katowice zone… You could even say that they took us by the hand. In all these… in
those solutions, in overcoming all those legal problems. In Warsaw, on the other hand, there we had to
wait… And then we all know the example […] when Mercedes had decided to invest in Poland, here, not
far from Gliwice, and the reason it all collapsed, it would seem… I say, it would seem, because… we read
about it in the newspapers… in Warsaw, it was withdrawn […] So, like I said, the higher—the worse.
Such positive examples, which appeared in the interviews, clearly show the sig-
niﬁcant and increasingly important role of local governments and administration in
creating a friendly climate for investment and business, not only on the large scale,
as in the above-mentioned special economic zones, but among ﬁrms in the small and
medium-size sector, which are the real fabric of business and development. We are
dealing here with changes in the external economic context. The actors are beginning
to become aware of their common goals. Political pressure is producing changes in
public functionaries’ attitudes toward entrepreneurs: with emerging consciousness
of a convergence of interests. Thus an institutional balance between the formal and
informal institutions regulating business is produced at the local level. At the higher
levels of the administration, however, there is still a long way to go to achieve a state
of balance. Higher public ofﬁcials, it appears from the interviews, still view the law
as an instrument of power and not a means of achieving common political goals (the
development of the country) or economic goals (more competitive economy).
Models of Relations between Formal and Informal Institutions
in the Field of Business Activity
Our analyses lead to the conclusion that in the sphere of formal and informal institu-
tions regulating business activities we are dealing with both elements of institutional
balance and imbalance. The emergence of substitutive or competitive regulations and
norms in the sphere of business activity results from historically preserved methods
of constructing and interpreting the law and also the enduring informal adaptive re-
actions. The long tradition of statelessness, partitions, and dependence on foreign
powers, followed by the period of communism, favoured the birth of a general convic-
tion that law is a tool of foreign powers (Podgórecki 1995). The period of so-called real
FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES OF DOING BUSINESS IN POLAND 501
socialism supported and preserved this type of attitude. After 1989 as well we were
dealing with unusually unfavourable phenomena from the viewpoint of the quality of
the law. Law-making became hostage to ongoing political games, and the law itself
began to be treated above all as an instrument of immediate political interests, and
not an important institution serving society.
Our research proves that we are still dealing with such an understanding of the
law andwith such rules of law-making. Complicated, unclear, internally contradictory,
and fragmentary legal regulations, together with their restrictive, discretionary, and
free interpretations, create an environment fostering uncertainty in business, and
consequently entrepreneurs’ deeper, generalized, distrust towards the state, the law,
and the public administration. As a result, in the economic ﬁeld, we have the problem
of that uncertainty being overcome through informal acts of ‘private connections’ and
other forms of soft corruption. Actors make use of the informal institutions ‘at hand’,
which have existed since the times of ‘real socialism’. The task of these institutions
in this case is to raise the effectiveness of business activity, which is hampered or
sometimes even blocked entirely by faulty regulations. On account of the severity
of the state authorities in executing certain regulations, we rarely encounter open
opposition to the ofﬁcial norms. Thus from the statements of the interviewees we
more often hear about substitutive institutions (private connections, acquaintances)
and accommodating institutions (poaching public ofﬁcials) than about competitive
ones (in this case, corruption).
Under the inﬂuence of the new formal context (the European Union and simpli-
ﬁcation of the law25), and the economic pressure of global capitalism in contact with
both entrepreneurs and functionaries, new types of informal institutions develop. As
discussed, to a large degree, formal institutions impose the rules of the game on the
actors in a given ﬁeld. These could be, for instance, regulations favouring the birth
of conﬂict, as mentioned, or cooperation, and one of the deciding factors in whether
there will be conﬂict or cooperation is the convergence or divergence of the aims of
the various groups of actors affected by the given regulations. EU regulations are
constructed so that while entrepreneurs and public functionaries retain the separate-
ness of their tasks, their aims are convergent. Thus some Polish entrepreneurs prefer
to take their enterprises abroad, and the majority of our interviewees had a very
positive opinion of the regulations and administrative functioning in western Euro-
pean countries. Another force for change in the sphere of informal institutions is the
global economic context, which impels politicians, and consequently public ofﬁcials,
to change their attitude toward entrepreneurs. The growth of entrepreneurship is in
their best political interest, and this requires creating the best possible conditions for
doing business in a given territory. This leads to the emergence at the local level of in-
formal complementary institutions (cooperation, the simpliﬁcation of administrative
25 We have in mind here the simpler legal regulations in other countries of the old EU, which were often
mentioned by interviewees who had done business abroad. The opposite to this, of course, is the ﬁltering
of EU legal requirements through Polish legislation, and the introduction on the occasion of additional
legislation—which is often not even the result of adapting Polish laws to EU legislation—with the result
that it all becomes even more complicated.
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procedures) intended to help formal institutions as a framework regulating business
activity. However, from the viewpoint of higher level public functionaries (regional,
and especially central ones), this convergence of aims with the aims of entrepreneurs
is signiﬁcantly looser. One way or another, the examples of informal—which does not
mean private—cooperation between politicians, public ofﬁcials, and entrepreneurs
are increasing in the ﬁeld of business activity.
On the basis of our analysis we can differentiate four models of relations between
formal and informal institutions:
1. The ‘antagonistic’ model reﬂects a situation in which the effect of formal regu-
lations has an antagonizing impact on relations between the main actors in the
business ﬁeld. In the case we analyzed, the multiplicity and severity of the regu-
lations generates opposition in the objectives of both groups, and in consequence
results in the informal institutions regulating business activity having a speciﬁc
form: distrust and mutual suspicion. This model reﬂects a state of institutional im-
balance as the result of conﬂict between the main groups of actors in the ﬁeld of
business activity. Formal and informal institutions become hostage to the hostile
relations between the groups.
2. The ‘parallel’ model refers to a situation in which the effect of the formal regula-
tions induces the main actors in the business ﬁeld to adopt various informal strate-
gies. The ineffectiveness of the law, which is the result of long cultural traditions
in law-making and attitudes to the law, leads to the creation of parallel, infor-
mal, adaptive institutions (buying bureaucrats), substitutive institutions (making
acquaintances in administrative ofﬁces), and competitive institutions (soft cor-
ruption). In this model, the institutional imbalance refers to the relation between
formal and informal institutions. The main groups of actors make use of informal
institutions to realize objectives different from those ofﬁcially premised.
3. The ‘alternative’ model describes a situation where an alternative institutional
environment appears, and thus changes the balance of power between the two
groups, favouring (1) the appearance of partly substitutive and partly comple-
mentary institutions (facilitating business activity and cooperation) in regards to
Polish law, as well as (2) the departure of entrepreneurs from their native ‘playing
ﬁeld’. In the case we analyzed, an alternative institutional environment tends to
produce the emergence of a new institutional balance in the ﬁeld, since the new
formal institutions introduced (here, EU law) foster the realization of common
economic goals by the most important actors.
4. The ‘integrated’ model refers to a situation where changes in the external context
(external informal institutions) require the main actors in the ﬁeld to realize
common goals. Here, it is particularly a matter of the effect of the global capitalist
economy shaping the rules of cooperation between public administration and
business. The necessity of coping with global competition requires the emergence
of institutions complementary to the formal regulations, particularly at the local
level. In this manner informal institutions appear (for instance, administrative
fast-tracks for local entrepreneurs), which help realize the objectives premised by
formal institutions.
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These models are separate constructs solely in the analytical sense. They function
simultaneously in the ﬁeld of business activity. The qualitative nature of the research
does not allow us to deﬁne the exact proportions of each of these models shaping
business activity; nevertheless, on the basis of an analysis of the empirical material,
we can state that the ﬁrst two models still dominate in the ﬁeld of business activity in
Poland, while the latter two are beginning gradually to increase their reach.
Summary
The aim of our article was to describe and analyze the institutional dynamic in the
sphere of business activity in Poland, in the context of accession to the European
Union. We assumed that the dynamic of the relation between formal and informal
institutions leads either to institutional balance or imbalance, which in the end con-
tributes to the higher or lower effectiveness of the economy as a whole. We then
advanced the more speciﬁc hypothesis that the relations and behaviours of actors in
the ﬁeld of Polish business activity constitute the result of the internal dynamics of
formal and informal institutions, the interactions of both types of institutions, and
the external institutional context. We assumed that the dependence of the legisla-
tive process on politics, the non-transparent inﬂuence of various interest groups, and
current events will foster the emergence of legal chaos and restrictive regulations. In
turn, on the assumption that informal institutions are spontaneous adaptive reactions
based on culturally available patterns, institutions will emerge that are, in regards
to the law, substitutive (such as, for instance, private relations or ‘making friends’
with public ofﬁcials), accommodating (among other things, in the form of poaching
bureaucrats), or competitive (in the form of favouritism, clientelism, or corruption).
As to the external institutional context, in the shape of EU law and the rules of global
competition, we assume it will have a dual inﬂuence on the change of relations and
principles in the Polish business ﬁeld: on the one hand, it creates an incentive to
cooperate and facilitate business activity, on the other, it could incline businessmen
to move their activity abroad, to other EU countries where the formal rules of play
allow for greater business effectiveness.
Empirically-based models of relations between formal and informal institutions
connected to the goals of themain groups of actors operating in a givenorganizational-
institutional ﬁeld allow the hypotheses presented to be conﬁrmed and the observations
collected to be generalized and associatedwith the basic differentiation of institutional
balance/imbalance in the ﬁeld of business activity.
Thus from the theoretical viewpoint, states of institutional balance and imbalance
are related ﬁrst with the convergence or divergence of formal and informal institu-
tions, and second, with the convergence or divergence of the goals of important groups
of actors in the given organizational-institutional ﬁeld. In consequence, bringing the
concept of institutional balance/imbalance to the category of the ﬁeld makes it possi-
ble to better understand the structure of interaction in the dual arrangement: relations
between the entities and relations between the rules of the game. Such a procedure
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makes it possible to transfer theoretical categories to empirical observations and vice
versa. In this sense, the problem of economic effectiveness/ineffectiveness can, on the
theoretical ground, be understood as a problem of institutional balance/imbalance.
Another element that needs to be taken into account is the dynamic of mutual ref-
erences between formal and informal institutions in time. The dependence on the
institutional path (North 1990) portrayed in the article supplements the picture of the
shaping of institutional models in a given organizational-institutional ﬁeld by show-
ing the history of mutual relations between formal and informal institutions and its
internal logic.
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